Yet, models of judgment and organization that are neither bureaucratic nor traditionally professional have established themselves in many sectors of both the private and public realms.
These models, which might be called post-bureaucratic -or in one important variation, experimentalist --see decision as governed by explicit but provisional norms and arising from multidisciplinary group deliberation. They imply forms of organization that combine local autonomy with centralized monitoring, foster continuous learning and revision, and take proactive approaches to error detection and correction.
I appeal in this paper to models of post-bureaucratic or experimentalist organization both to emphasize the extent to which prosecution has lagged other sectors in its understanding of judgment and organization and to connect the important innovations that have occurred in prosecution to developments in other fields.
The analysis of competing conceptions of organization has implications for the relation of prosecutorial discretion and democracy. Post-bureaucratic organization has two features that promise to enhance democratic accountability -greater transparency and greater potential for stakeholder participation.
I. Traditional Premises
The discretion part of "prosecutorial discretion" connotes a combination of flexibility and discipline that elides arbitrariness on the one hand and regimentation on the other. Our key paradigm for such activity is the traditional idea of professional judgment. 1 In the paradigm, judgment is a decision by an individual applying a discrete body of university-based knowledge to a particular situation. The decision is presumptively all-thingsconsidered, taking account both the full range of knowledge within the professional field (but not beyond the field's boundaries) and of all relevant aspects of the particular situation. It is substantially tacit and ineffable; it cannot be explained fully to lay people and its correctness cannot be determined confidently even by peers in a large fraction of instances. And the decision is difficult to observe, in part, because it is so sensitive to myriad particular facts and in part because many of these facts are confidential. The disciplines such judgments implement are understood as stable, and their general effectiveness can only be assessed in informal ways. This type of judgment implies a distinctive form of organization. Work units tend to be organized by discipline, with workers supervised by members of the same profession and physically separated from people in other fields. Offices tend to be relatively decentralized.
Workers are only loosely supervised. Instead, responsibility is assured in substantial part by licensing controls that certify the adequacy of training and ethical disposition on entry. Learning on the job occurs most characteristically through informal association with supervisors and mentors. These mechanisms are supplemented by processes of error-detection and correction that are initiated by complaints. Although the complaint processes are initiated by clients, the key judgments are made by, or strongly influenced by, professional peers. Errors are understood as idiosyncratic and are adjudicated and remedied one-by-one.
This vision of professional judgment has been nowhere more entrenched than in law, and in particular in the discussion of prosecutorial discretion. Consider three recent examples:
An article by Zachary Price on the political and constitutional dimensions of enforcement discretion has received a lot of attention, in part because of its pertinence to various controversial initiatives of the Obama administration, including guidelines for enforcement of immigration, controlled substance, and health care laws.
In general, Price views as undesirable, constitutionally suspect, or worse most efforts by prosecutors to discipline or make transparent their enforcement decisions through explicit rules, guidelines, or general norms. His most encompassing objection derives from a conception of law and the separation of powers. It rests on a distinction between "categorical" or "across the board" norms and "individualized" or "case specific" judgments. "Executive nonenforcment discretion extends only to case specific considerations," he insists.
2 This is because wholesale non-enforcement amounts to "making" or "re-making" law, which is a legislative power, while only retail nonenforcement is consistent with the executive function of "applying" the law. If, for example, it is impossible or undesirable to enforce the immigration laws fully against undocumented residents, the executive branch should not specify the criteria it will use to select residents for deportation but should instead permit such decisions to be made by frontline agents, asylum officers, and administrative law judges with minimal guidance other than the statutes and an informal sense of equity. condemned by the courts in the prior ten years. As far as the record showed, the agency did no relevant training. The plaintiffs invoked earlier cases holding that the failure of a police department to provide training in the use of deadly force could violate the Constitution.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, rejected the idea that the police cases were relevant to prosecutors. He emphasized that lawyers, to a far greater extent than police officers, must undergo lengthy education and then demonstrate their general knowledge on a demanding examination prior to entering the occupation. "These threshold requirements are designed to ensure that all new attorneys have learned how to find, understand, and apply legal rules." In addition, lawyers are screened at entry for "character and fitness" and subjected to a regime of peer discipline throughout their careers. The opinion concludes that the senior officials "were entitled to rely on the prosecutors' professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of a specific reason" to believe they were not qualified.
3
Finally, Rachel Barkow has advanced a proposal for re-organizing prosecutorial activity that focuses on the problem of bias. Barkow is worried about the kind of bias that arises from the design of professional roles. US prosecutors are normally responsible both for investigating and referring for prosecution on the one hand and for charging, determining what punishment to seek, and negotiating with the defendant on the other. Bias arises from the tendency of prosecutor to identify cognitively and emotionally with the understanding of the case that emerges in the investigation stage. This makes her resistant to revising this interpretation as new information emerges later. Barkow's solution is to sub-divide functions, assigning separate lawyers to the tasks of investigation and "adjudication" (i.e., charging and plea bargaining).
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The proposal departs from the traditional professional view in dividing the professional decision in two and bringing in a second decision-maker. responding to bias in this manner carries a serious cost: the second decision-maker, by virtue of his separation from the investigation, may lack information that should be considered in the "adjudication" decisions.
II. Recent Trends
This traditional view of decision-making is in strong tension with recent thinking in many fields about the nature of decision-making and its implications for institutional design. In field after field, practices have been re-designed on the basis of an opposed understanding. In modern industrial organization, designers reject the tacit particularistic decisionmaking associated with traditional "craft"-style production (an industrial analogue to professionalism). They insist that tacit norms be made explicit. The craftsmen will rely on a learned, inarticulate sense of appositeness in deciding, say, how to apply stain to a table and what level of finish should be deemed adequate. Modern production insists these norms be made explicit and precise. 9 There are three reasons for this insistence. The process by which norms are articulated requires reflection that improves the quality of decisions. Explicit norms can be taught more quickly to newcomers. The learning model common to professionals and craft workers in which young workers learn from their seniors through a kind of informal osmosis has been discarded as inefficient. And most importantly, decisions under explicit norms are more transparent to observers; so they are more easily assessed and changed. The traditional model assumes a relatively stable body of specialized knowledge. But many fields face intensified pressure to adapt to changing circumstances.
Moreover, in the opposed understanding of judgment, the paradigmatic decision-maker is no longer an individual but a group that draws, not on a single discipline, but on several. Group decisions tend to be more consistent than individual ones, and they can synthesize a broader range of knowledge. Moreover, individual participants in groups feel pressure to consciously consider and articulate matters they would take for granted in solitary or more homogeneous settings.
Group decision-making is in part a response to the problem of professional bias that At the same time, decisions tend to be multidisciplinary. This tendency responds to two developments. One is the evolution of perceptions of social problems. Some pressing problems also Justice Thomas's reply in his concurrence that statistical results are unpersuasive in part because the analysts must abstract from the rich particularity observed by judges and juries at the trials. Slip Op. at 4-6. The reply misses the point of the analyses, which purport to show that the decisions are being driven by tacit criteria rather than ineffable particularity. Professionals often resist the move away from the traditional understanding of judgment because they assume such a move would entail bureaucratic organization. They resist bureaucracy because it threatens individual fairness by regimenting judgment. In addition, while bureaucracy is superficially more compatible with public accountability than professionalism, in practice it can be equally opaque. Modern organizations that purport to operate in hierarchical, rule-governed manner described by Max Weber and Frederick Taylor in fact make room for a lot of frontline discretion. This discretion tends to be exercised informally on the basis of tacit peer cultures, and it tends to be substantially unobservable by supervisors and the public. Frontline agents ("street-level bureaucrats") can depart from the rules both for benign reasons (when the rules dictate patently unjust or inefficient decisions) and malign ones. Supervisors tolerate lowvisibility rule departures either because the limits of their capacity to monitor leave them no choice or because they favor the benign departures. But benign or malign, low-visibility discretion is unaccountable except perhaps through the kind of socialization and recruitment controls that the critics assert make professionalism an inadequate mode of organization for the tasks in question. repudiates both inflexible rules and low-visibility discretion. Decision-making in these regimes tends to be group and multidisciplinary. Accountability does not depend on either on monitoring compliance with fixed rules or socialization into an ineffable culture. The most distinctive mechanisms are (1) presumptive rules; (2) root cause analysis of unexpected events; (3) peer review; and (4) performance measurement.
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All these features can be observed in current prosecution practice. However, they seem less widespread and deep-rooted here than in other fields, and as Price, Thomas, and Barkow illustrate, they are often ignored or misunderstood. Indeed where we find prosecutors involved in sophisticated post-bureaucratic regimes, they often seem to have been pulled in by leaders in fields other than law. Problem-Oriented Policing, which has reconceived crime control strategies, and the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, which has transformed pretrial detention of juveniles, are examples.
12 Prosecutors play important roles in both, but most of the pioneering work has been done, in the first, by police officers and criminal justice academics In the Community Prosecution model, decision-makers are guided directly by the ultimate goals of public safety and quality of life. The model assumes that felony prosecution is not a uniformly effective intervention and that, even when it is effective, it is best combined with other strategies. The goal is to craft solutions tailored to specific problems. Lawyers work in offices with non-lawyer specialists and engage continuously with other agencies and stakeholders.
The term "community prosecution" connotes local initiatives, but the post-bureaucratic architecture Coles describes can be applied to initiatives on any scale. Ideally, local efforts are linked through central institutions that measure effectiveness and pool information on the relative success of different strategies. At the same time, national and international interventions can devolve operating initiatives to frontline actors while monitoring and analyzing their efficacy.
III. Elements of Post-Bureaucratic Organization
At any scale, the key features of post-bureaucratic organization are the presumptive rule, root cause analysis, peer review, and performance measurement. Note that each challenges the traditional dichotomy between bureaucratic and professional organization, and the associated premises that we must choose between rule-based and standards-based judgment and between centralized and decentralized organization.
A. Presumptive Rule
A presumptive rule is neither a rule (a norm that dictates decision on the basis of a limited number of specified factors) nor a standard (a general value to be furthered by an allthings-considered judgment). A presumptive rule is more specific than a standard, but unlike a bureaucratic rule, those to whom it is addressed are expected to depart from it in circumstances where it would be counter-productive to follow it. The departure, however, must be signaled, and it triggers an immediate review of the departure. When the departure is sustained, the rule gets re-written to reflect the new understanding achieved through review.
Practice under a regime of presumptive rules is more transparent because it conforms more tightly to the rules than in a conventional bureaucracy. Practice is also more self-conscious since actors must justify decisions that would be taken for granted in a rule-governed regime. In a bureaucracy, following the rule is always an acceptable explanation, and rule departures are generally unobserved or ignored. But in a post-bureaucratic regime, following the rule is not appropriate where doing so would be counter-productive, and departures must be transparent. A key goal is to induce and facilitate learning. This occurs in two ways. The duty to depart when the rules are ineffective and to signal departure feeds back information from the frontline that facilitates revision. Second, as I will shortly emphasize, experimentalist regimes subject practices to testing, and only explicit practices can be tested with any rigor.
Constitutional doctrine on prosecution has shown little concern with internal administration. The courts insist that administrators respond to indications of frontline violations of rules they themselves have promulgated, but where those rules (and relevant statutes) leave prosecutors discretion, they seem indifferent to whether offices take initiative to structure that discretion.
14 Practice is thus free to vary, and it does widely. In some quarters, judgments are left to informal processes and minimally supervised individual decision-making. But we also find sophisticated policy manuals that make use of the presumptive rule. The Department of Justice U.S. Attorneys Manual is a notable example. It sets out some policies in detail and then says that local offices may depart from them "[i]n the interests of fair and effective law enforcement" but only with the approval of the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.
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The Attorneys Manual deals mostly with trans-substantive rules that apply to practices that recur across various initiatives. They do not cover some important practices, and they do not deal in detail with decisions about the allocation of resources across initiatives or with the strategic configuration of particular initiatives. In a fully articulated presumptive rule regime, the rules form a plan that reflects a coherent but provisional understanding of the relevant mission. The plan is revised periodically both in both piecemeal and overall re-assessments. A comprehensive plan embraces sets of more specific plans.
Plans of this kind are most readily found in some self-consciously reformist initiatives, such as drug courts and problem-oriented policing. Problem-oriented policing was developed Traditionally, probation officers made detention issues through minimally supervised individual all-things-considered judgments. Reformers believed that these judgments tended to be inconsistent, but there was no way to tell for sure because of limited review and the absence of articulated norms. Gradually this process has been replaced by one in which a scorecard dictates decision on the basis of numerically scored indicators, such as prior offenses, school attendance, or substance abuse. The scorecard is a presumptive rule. The decisions it dictates can be overridden, but only with the approval of a supervisor. When the scoring norms are periodically reviewed, reviewers look at overrides to see if they suggest inadequacies in the rules. The reforms have led to more consistent judgments and have made it possible to investigate the predictive power of the indicators. They seem to have contributed to declines in detention in most jurisdictions that have adopted them and to have reduced racial disparities in some.
B. Root Cause Analysis of Significant Operating Events
A significant operating event is an occurrence involving actual or potential harm that is unexpected or cannot be immediately explained. Examples include abnormal adverse health events in hospitals or "near misses" in aviation. Bureaucracy tends to treat such events as idiosyncratic. It tends to ignore the ones that do not involve tangible harm. It tends to respond to harm by sanctioning those responsible and/or compensating those who suffer the harm.
Post-bureaucratic organization requires more. Rather than viewing such events as idiosyncratic, it sees them as symptoms of potential systemic problems. Thus, it subjects them to root cause analysis. It traces the causal stage back through the system. The "5 Whys" slogan from the Toyota Production System suggests as a rule-of-thumb that the analysis goes back five stages. The goal is to use the event as a learning opportunity by exploiting its diagnostic significance.
For example, a Brady violation could signal a need for training of a particular prosecutor, a need for better information technology to track evidence and disclosure, or better communication between police and prosecutor, or clearer assignment of responsibilities for Brady compliance among those responsible for a case. Assigning blame to a particular prosecutor will not necessarily distinguish among these explanations, nor will sanctioning the prosecutor or compensating the defendant guarantee that the problem will be remedied. Root cause analysis insists on ambitious diagnosis and remediation.
Such practices, however, are little developed in prosecution. The courts rely mainly on end-of-the-pipe punitive and compensatory remedies. A defendant who can show misconduct may get evidence suppressed or a case dismissed or damages. However, such remedies are available only in the case of actual tangible harm, and they require proof that is often unavailable. Moreover, they have small deterrent effect, since the responsible officials virtually never bear their costs. Post-conviction exonerations have been numerous in recent years, often prompted by DNA analysis. The discovery of a wrongful conviction is an unexpected adverse event of the sort that would prompt root cause analysis in many fields. Hospitals, for example, conduct searing "mortality-morbidity" reviews in comparable circumstances. But no such practice is standard in prosecution. that the California attorney general explain why her office had not filed criminal charges against a prosecutor who lied in an early stage of the case before him.
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It is important to sanction willful violations, but doing so is not adequate, and the focus on egregious cases can have perverse effects. Post-bureaucracy urges intervention, not just to induce compliance with clear obligations, but to promote learning. Many events that do not imply willful wrongdoing may yield diagnostic intervention. A search for causes can be informative and lead to valuable reforms. The "after action" reviews undertaken sometimes in high-profile cases can facilitate valuable inquiry of this sort.
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If retrospective inquiry is predominantly associated with punishment or humiliation, it may have two unfortunate effects.
Actors will hide or misreport information for fear it will used to inculpate them. And peers will be reluctant to express reservations about each other's performance, since criticism implies incompetence or immorality.
C. Peer Review
In the broadest sense, peer review refers to review of practice decisions by people working in the same field as those who made the decisions in question. As such, it overlaps the other elements of the post-bureaucratic approach. Here, however, I use the term more specifically to refer to relatively intense and qualitative review by peers of representative or exceptionally challenging decisions or practices. "Peer" is a capacious and somewhat ambiguous term in a world where decisions are typically multidisciplinary. The key desideraturm is that review involve people working on comparable problems. Police officers or social workers might be appropriate members of a peer review team for a prosecutor or prosecutorial office. Reviewers could come from inside or outside the office.
Peer review is above all a learning process. The lawyer under review learns both by selfassessment and explanation of his decisions and by critical response from the reviewers. At the same time, peer review promotes the exchange of information across lawyers in the same office, and where the reviewers are outsiders, across offices. This means that lawyers can learn alternative approaches and benefit from others' experiences with them. It also tends to make practice decisions more consistent to the extent the peers develop a shared understanding that informs their decisions.
Peer review is most extensively developed in medicine. It takes various forms. In addition to "mortality-morbidity" reviews of adverse events, there is professional recertification review in which a particular practitioner's practice over a period of time is examined. And there is institutional certification review in which a hospital's operations and structures are assessed periodically. In addition, peer review can focus on particular practices; new treatments, where formal clinical trials are impracticable, are assessed through informal peer discussion.
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All these variations could be readily applied to law and to prosecution in particular.
Perhaps the most ambitious involve the kind of intense qualitative discussion of particular cases of a sort exemplified in "morality-morbidity" reviews. The review need not be focused on cases with bad outcomes. It could draw random samples of cases, stratified to capture relevant categories where appropriate. Kathleen Noonan, Charles Sabel, and I have described such a procedure employed by social workers in some child welfare systems. 20 It is hard to find ambitious versions of such systems in law, and they are sometimes actively resisted. Gary
Bellow once proposed and experimented with a version of such a system among civil legal aid programs. Observers were surprised both by the volume of errors or suggestions for improvement that reviewers found or made and by the amount of resistance by practitioners to the process, even when it was divorced from personnel or compensation decisions. 21 Outside reviewers in law may create risks to preserving confidentiality. These concerns are less severe with prosecutors than in other areas. Since the client -the government --has a long-term interest in the quality of its lawyers' work, consent should be easier to get. And in any event, the concern is also present in medicine but has been overcome there with the help of facilitative legislation.
Even when review is done by insiders,, the bar has tended toward indifference if not hostility. The American Bar Association flirted with the idea of prescribing that firms institute 19 internal peer review procedures but quietly gave up the idea. 22 The bar has moved beyond the traditional idea that key professional learning takes place prior to certification by mandating "continuing legal education". But these programs, even when well prepared, rarely focus on particular practice decisions in richly observed contexts.
D. Performance Measurement
Performance is measured by translating the institution's goals into metrics and then periodically applying them. This was once a radical idea in the professions, and it is still controversial, but it has received increasing attention. Writing about a major federal gun-control The most sophisticated efforts combine aggregate metrics with ongoing rule revision, root cause analysis, and peer review. Examples can be found in initiatives inspired by the Vera Institute Project on Racial Justice. In the manner of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, the program prescribes ongoing monitoring of racial disparities in the effects of prosecution practices, root cause analysis of disparities, and scanning for reforms that might mitigate the disparities. In Milwaukee, for example, sophisticated implementation that included revisions of charging practices and the development of diversion programs has significantly reduced disparities. 27 Another example is the "focused deterrence" strategy that starts by identifying violenceprone actors through intensive surveillance and then offers them a package of moral exhortation, threats of prosecution for past offenses, and offers of social services (for example, job training or substance abuse treatment). A distinctive component of the regime is the "call in" which invites (or in the case of probationers, requires) attendance at a meeting where prosecutors, community leaders, police, and social workers make presentation. In addition to creating tangible incentives for compliance, the intervention is designed to leverage peer relations by threatening or promising group punishments or benefits. Many focused deterrence regimes have been studied with rigor. An example from Cincinnati illustrates how measurement has been sufficiently finegrained to yield information useful for reconfiguring the program to eliminate or revise specific ineffective elements. 28 
IV. Democracy
We generally think of democratic accountability in terms of elections or the more diffuse pressures of public opinion. There is some ambiguity about the range of prosecutorial activity that should be controlled democratically. In some respects, prosecutors resemble judges. They make decisions of great consequence that should be made disinterestedly and reflectively on the Public accountability seems most productive and least dangerous to fairness values when it focuses on general patterns of practice rather than individual decisions. Unfortunately, this has not been the traditional focus of discussion. Prosecution often has a low profile in elections and public debate. Incumbents running for re-election are often unchallenged and usually re-elected.
Moreover, where there is appraisal, it tends not to focus on general patterns. Discussion of practice tends to focus on a few high-profile cases. Otherwise, discussion is pre-occupied with the background qualifications and character of the candidates.
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This situation is in part a function of the traditional conception of prosecutorial work that emphasizes individual, ineffable judgment. We have seen that the traditional conception puts great emphasis on character and qualifications because it assumes that individual judgments are difficult to assess. In addition, the traditional conception assumes that judgment is necessarily idiosyncratic and ineffable; so it resists efforts to cabin discretion through explicit rules or to measure its effects. Practice under these assumptions is necessarily opaque.
The post-bureaucratic trends in the organization of prosecutorial discretion have two broad implications for democratic control of prosecutorial power. First, the basic tendency of post-bureaucratic reform is to make the broader system transparent in a way that increases control and adaptive capacity by insiders and outsiders alike. These reforms potentially enhance both fairness and accountability. Charles Sabel and I have argued that there is (or should be) a duty of responsible administration that requires administrators to adopt reforms to manage transparently so that courts and citizens can assess their compliance with substantive norms. 30 We find this duty in convergent themes of constitutional, statutory and common law, as they have been applied to a range of public institutions, including, prisons, police departments, and welfare programs. Courts have been reluctant to put such pressure on prosecution offices, in part because of the persistence of the traditional conception of prosecutorial judgment and the related assumption that accountability must take bureaucratic forms that would rigidify practice inappropriately. But initiatives from prosecutors themselves have demonstrated that there are ways of structuring discretion that enhance transparency without strait-jacketing practice. Courts could draw on these efforts to induce reforms by recalcitrant offices.
The "duty of responsible administration" idea runs directly counter to arguments like Price's that find the self-conscious structuring of prosecutorial discretion as an illegitimate assertion of law-making powers by executive officials. Price's argument implies that internal regulation enhances the power of senior administrators, rather than making it more accountable. This is wrong. A top administrator who wants to impose her will on the frontline has many tools for doing so without rule-making and transparent forms of review. She can, for example, make hiring, promotion, and compensation decisions on the basis of low-visibility signals of loyalty to her goals. Moreover, even where top officials leave broad autonomy to the frontline, there is no reason to assume that frontline decisions are benign. Without structure, frontline decisions may reflect the prejudices of the agents or may turn out to vary in arbitrary ways.
Second, the post-bureaucratic reforms often appeal to a conception of democracy somewhat different from the one that emphasizes elections. This alternative conception has attractive features, and it suggests the possibility of a thicker form of political legitimation.
The alternative conception is stakeholder democracy. Here decisions should be made, where feasible, locally by the people most affected and knowledgeable about them. General elections are inadequate both because they bundle far too many issues for people to make and register informed decisions about, and because they weigh all votes equally on all issues without regard to intensity of knowledge or interest.
31 (Some account of intensity is taken in the design of jurisdictions and the assignment of issues to them, but within even local jurisdictions there is a wide variation in knowledge and personal stake on many issues.)
Stakeholder democracy has to deal with the problem of who to admit to participation and how to reconcile differences when stakeholders disagree. But to the extent that representatives of diverse interests can come close to consensus on local interventions, they may confer a kind of democratic legitimacy that is unavailable in other processes. Even when stakeholders do not 31 See the discussion of the "problem of intensity" in electoral democracy in Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956) . agree, their engagement may produce information that can influence official decision in ways that make it more acceptable.
The stakeholder conception resonates with various initiatives associated with "community prosecution". These initiatives are driven by the perceptions that, to the extent that the process is concerned with justice for victims, it should be more directly responsive to them; and to the extent it is concerned with deterrence, its efforts are most efficiently configured when coordinated with actions of other institutions and citizens and when they are configured in the light of information that can best be extracted through broad consultation.
In the stakeholder conception, the legislature's role is not to authorize specific decisions prospectively. Rather, the legislature sets basic parameters and provides resources for local deliberations and for central review of their efficacy. The legislature then retrospectively assesses the success of various intervention, perhaps mandating continuing experimentation where they are ineffective and perhaps codifying or promoting specific ones where success has been demonstrated.
Stakeholder participation is not necessarily beneficial. It can involve unproductive and expensive process costs and capture by unrepresentative sub-constituencies. But it has the potential to vindicate a different but complementary ideal of democracy from the one usually assumed in discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
